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Rielage and Tucker: The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s

of this previously unavailable 1950s
manuscript, properly seeing contemporary United States–China strategic
relations as his backdrop, has made
Lo’s encyclopedic knowledge available
to us. However, Lo’s book is instructive beyond that; China as a Sea Power
is a magisterial contribution to the
study of world maritime history and
should be known everywhere by those
who are interested in that subject.
Lo was determined to illuminate China’s
maritime history to edify his countrymen, who had seen the consequences
of a lack of naval power. In the first
decades of Lo’s life, foreign navies dominated China’s coastal ports and also
had wide-ranging rights in other ports
hundreds of miles up the great rivers. It
was as if foreign navies could, by right,
sail at will up the Mississippi from New
Orleans to Minneapolis. The Chinese
had become accustomed to the seeming
inevitability of such circumstances and
knew of the failures to revive Chinese
naval power at the end of the nineteenth
century and of Japan’s easy closure of
China’s ports between 1937 and 1945. It
was for them that Lo wanted to present
a grand history of Chinese power on
the sea, and not only naval power but
seaborne commercial power and the
urbanization, wealth, and sophistication
that it had created in great ages past.
China’s remarkable efflorescence that
we see today derives from such visions.
Of this book’s many compelling accounts, perhaps the richest is Lo’s
description of the naval campaigns of
the Mongols, who, as the Yuan dynasty,
ruled China between 1271 and 1368.
The Mongols, who had no experience fighting at sea, quickly adapted
and soon organized armadas built and
manned by their new Chinese subjects.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Spring2013Review.indb 123

b o o k r e v i e ws

123

They launched invasions northward
into the East China Sea and southward
into the South China Sea. Today’s
increasingly visible and vocal Chinese
admirals seem eager to draw inspiration from these huge undertakings, but
for all the immense capabilities they
demonstrated, Kublai Khan’s two invasions of Japan and his three invasions
of Vietnam in the thirteenth century
all ended in disaster. Eight centuries
later, in his November 2012 valedictory
address, Hu Jintao, China’s outgoing
president and the Communist Party’s
general secretary, urged his successors
“to build China into a maritime power.”
In this they would be well advised to
read Lo Jung-pang’s account of China’s
past glories as a sea power, not only as
inspiration but also as a cautionary tale.
charles horner

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, and author of
Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat:
Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012. 312pp. $39.50

President Dwight D. Eisenhower is
remembered in history as a dedicated
Cold Warrior whose staunch anticommunism included commitment to the
containment and rollback of communism in Asia. In The China Threat
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker challenges
this narrative, suggesting that Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles possessed a more nuanced view
of China than is generally supposed.
Tucker is an established and respected
historian of U.S. policy toward China
whose earlier works include a study
of U.S.-Chinese relations during the
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second Harry Truman administration.
In this work, she soundly establishes
that Eisenhower and Dulles did not
view the communist world as a monolith. In contrast to many American
observers, Eisenhower concluded that
Mao’s control of China was a permanent fact and that U.S. rollback of the
Chinese communist revolution was
unlikely. Like Truman before him, he
disparaged Chinese Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-shek and his unrealistic
hopes for reestablishing himself on
the mainland. Eisenhower and Dulles
believed that Mao could create his
own path within international communism, following the independent
path of Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito. In
this view they anticipated the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split before it came
to pass. They viewed U.S. economic
sanctions against China as counterproductive, strengthening ties between the
communist-bloc nations. Yet despite
these assessments, Eisenhower continued on a course of confrontation with
China, conducting covert operations
and propaganda against China, tying
Taiwan into a mutual-defense treaty,
and enforcing economic sanctions
against the mainland. Tucker thus faces
the task of explaining an Eisenhower
who “disparaged much of what passed
for China policy under his own administration” yet never publicly expressed or
substantially acted on his convictions.
Eisenhower and Dulles both saw U.S.
interests in Asia as secondary to those
in Europe. Both had strong personal
ties to the European allies and to NATO
and were convinced that Europe was
America’s enduring partner and the
key arena for arresting communist
expansion. Changing U.S.-China policy
carried the probability of significant
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political cost. Because the Republican
Party had made Truman’s “loss of China” a central issue in the 1952 campaign,
moderating the U.S. approach would
have required Eisenhower to challenge
both his own party and the influential
anticommunist “China lobby.” Political capital expended on China policy
would come at the expense of essential
support for European efforts—a cost
Eisenhower was not willing to pay.
In the end, the fact that Eisenhower
and Dulles had a less hard-line view of
U.S. relations with China than is commonly assessed becomes a case study
in the use and limitation of presidential
power. The subtleties of Eisenhower’s
view of Asia pointed to constraints
on his action, real and perceived, and
made the cost of a potential change
in U.S. policy more than Eisenhower
was willing to bear. As Tucker concludes, in the end Eisenhower did not
get the China policy he wanted, but
he did get the China policy he made.
commander dale c. rielage, usn

Strachan, Hew, and Sibylle Scheipers, eds. The
Changing Character of War. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 2011. 564pp. $110

Academic strategists have been agonizing over whether war is changing its
character or is being changed by any
manner of influences, ranging from
technology to “war amongst the people,”
since the fall of the Soviet Union. The
tragedy of September 11th added
impetus to this inquiry. The Oxford
Leverhulme Changing Character of
War program, which ran from 2003
to 2009, has been to date the most
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